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The remarkable social impact and economic success
of the Internet is in many ways directly attributable
to the architectural characteristics that were part of
its design. The Internet was designed with no
gatekeepers over new content or services.
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INTRODUCTION
We live in a new age of global communications. This
technological age is now threatened by exaggerations that arise
from fear of the unknown. What once was a free frontier of
discovery has now become a source of contention. Governments
around the world have continued to push toward greater
surveillance in what should be an area of accessible knowledge.
This recent governmental approach vis-à-vis the Internet is not
only misguided, but also contrary to the values that supposedly
guide democratic nations. This Article does not deny that threats
exist in cyberspace, but it warns against fear-based actions that
would encroach on the rights that human beings cherish. In
particular, this Article observes that the regulation of the Internet
must be aimed at the development of a cyberspace protected by
governments, which must also maintain access to information for
their citizens in light of a “world public order of human dignity,”
“one which approximates the optimum access by all human beings
to all things they cherish.”2
It is not irrelevant to point out that the Internet continues to be
a vast frontier of information. The idea that it can be divided by
virtual borders disregards the network’s purpose and its value to
society. “The benefits of the open and accessible Internet are
nearly incalculable and their loss would wreak significant social
and economic damage.”3 The Internet is of great significance at
the international level because humanity has learned to appreciate
the benefits of this technology, while also noticing the political
challenges attached to it.
The nature of Cyberspace rests in its effective malleability,
conceived of by the scientists and academics around the world that
worked on its creation and made the decision to encourage the
2

See W. Michael Reisman, Siegfried Wiessner & Andrew R. Willard, The New
Haven School: A Brief Introduction, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 575, 576 (2007) (defining
“public order of human dignity” when discussing the New Haven School).
3
Vinton Cerf, Keep the Internet Open, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2012), http://www.ny
times.com/2012/05/25/opinion/keep-the-internet-open.html.
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constant evolution of this medium.4 Today, having sufficient
access to the Internet’s information has arguably become a
prerequisite for the enjoyment of human life. The Internet has
become a center for human literacy and has the potential to offer
numerous kinds of instruction at lower costs and with higher
quality than previous media could offer.5
This Article will argue that the concept of a “cybered
Westphalian age,”6 as a cure to all threats in the Internet, has the
potential to do more harm than good.
The international
community is now faced with a possible policy shift from the
current state of the Internet, which is one of shared knowledge,
toward the active practice of censorship and filtered content, which
will have devastating consequences.
The matter of alternative approaches to Internet regulation and
the values surrounding human dignity brings the discussion back to
the original consideration: the rights that human beings cherish.
As has happened before in human history, when considering the
benefits and threats found on the Internet, we are reminded that
behind every new technology lurks someone’s desire to exert
control over it. Debates pertaining to the Internet, such as issues of
personal privacy, equality of access, censorship, and computer
crimes, center on the larger issue of control. There are no longer
any doubts about the fact that whoever controls the Internet also
controls access to information.
To see the Internet as something that must be controlled at any
cost is self-defeating. Although there is a need for security
measures in cyberspace, security ought to be achieved with due
regard to the network’s architecture and without destroying the
openness obtained by the creators of the Internet.7 Even though a
4
See generally KATIE HAFNER & MATTHEW LYON, WHERE WIZARDS STAY UP LATE
(2006) (telling the story of the inventors of the Internet).
5
See Frances Cairncross & Kaija Pöysti, ICTs for Education and Building Human
Capital, in VISIONS OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (Lara Srivastava ed.), available at
http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/visions/education/index.html (stating that many educators see
the role of information and communications technologies as delivering a higher quality
education at a lower cost).
6
See Chris C. Demchak & Peter Dombrowski, Rise of a Cybered Westphalian Age,
STRATEGIC STUD. Q., Spring 2011, at 32, 32, 36–39.
7
See generally HAFNER & LYON, supra note 4.
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growing number of nation-states are introducing content filtering,8
excessive censorship of online content should not be seen as an
exemplary practice now or in the future. The Internet has changed
human history forever, and this technological marvel has brought
challenges to recognized fundamental freedoms, the meaning of
ethics, and human dignity.9 Governments should not define their
priorities based solely on the risks associated with cybercrime.
Doing so would inevitably lead to a “fenced” cyberspace,10 while
ignoring the resulting harms of unequal access to information and
undue surveillance.
This Article also argues that the historical importance of freely
accessing information and the Roman legal concept of jus gentium
may be used as signposts for the further development of
cyberspace regulation. Instead of a “Westphalian” cyberspace
order, an alternative regime is presented, one also originating from
the core of international law but rooted in ancient times, rather than
the beginning of the Age of Enlightenment.
The international law theory of jus gentium originated with the
ancient Roman legal system, and it is based on the understanding
that legal relationships and institutions are governed by a law
common to all humanity.11 This legal theory was revisited by legal
scholars, who began to recognize the significance of the idea of
“common good for the international legal order,” particularly
because this idea conceived of humanity as “a moral and political

8
See Robert Faris & Nart Villeneuve, Measuring Global Internet Filtering, in
ACCESS DENIED 5, 5 (Ronald Deibert, e.t. al. eds., 2008) (finding twenty-six of forty
countries surveyed employed filtering and expecting that number to rise); see also
ROBERT DEIBERT et al., ACCESS CONTROLLED: THE SHAPING OF POWER, RIGHTS, AND
RULE IN CYBERSPACE 3–15 (Ronald Deibert e.t. al. eds., 2010) (discussing the evolving
scale of Internet filtering).
9
Maud de Boer-Buquicchio, Foreword to DIVINA FRAU-MEIGS, MEDIA MATTERS IN
THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY—TOWARDS A HUMAN
RIGHTS-BASED GOVERNANCE 5, 5 (2011).
10
See Demchak & Dombrowski, supra note 6, at 32–35 (discussing the “fencing” of
cyberspace in response to threats such as cybercrime).
11
1 R. W. DYSON, NATURAL LAW AND POLITICAL REALISM IN THE HISTORY OF
POLITICAL THOUGHT, 127–28 (2005); see also DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW
IN ANTIQUITY 84–85 (2004).
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entity, deducing therefrom certain basic obligations for States.”12
By 1749, it was argued that nation-states, bound together by
nature, were required to maintain said bond.13 The theologian St.
Thomas Aquinas had identified Divine law within humanity,
explaining that natural law represented how humanity took part of
Divine Law.14 As a result, St. Thomas Aquinas would have seen
this bond among nation-states assured by Divine law. Hugo
Grotius had already written about the law of all nations and its
innate characteristic in every individual.15 Grotius explained the
law of all nations as the “law derived from nature, the common
mother of us all, whose bounty falls on all, and whose sway
extends over those who rule nations, and which is held most sacred
by those who are most scrupulously just.”16 He inferred a
characteristic of stewardship required of nations acting in trust for
all humanity. Other writers moved their discussion to the human
individual’s rights and duties within the nation-state, and by 1754
jus gentium was also considered a “harmonizing process” between
individuals and nation-states, providing a system of values in
which peace was needed for their natural coexistence.17
Attempts to normalize the concept of a quasi-territorial
delimitation of cyberspace will produce adverse results. A
stronger case can be made that no territorially-based regime may
be successfully applied to an aterritorial cyberspace.18
Transboundary accord, based on the cultural common ground
central to ancient legal and social philosophy, is better than a

12
Juliane Kokott & Frank Hoffmeister, International Public Order, in THE MAX
PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 2 (Heidelberg and Oxford
Univ. Press 2013).
13
Id.
14
Thomas Aquinas, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I-II, q. 91, art. 2–5 (Fathers of the English
Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros. 1947).
15
See HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 5 (James Brown Scott ed., Ralph
Van Deman Magoffin, Oxford University Press 1916).
16
Id.
17
Stephan Verosta, History of International Law, 1648 to 1815, in THE MAX PLANCK
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 62 (Heidelberg and Oxford Univ. Press
2013).
18
See David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1367–76 (1996).
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territorial regime for governance of the global phenomenon that is
cyberspace.
There are noted national cyber-security interests that provoke
the idea of reflecting the territorial mechanism of national selfdefense within the “fifth battlefield” that is cyberspace in exactly
the same way as in the other four fields of state confrontation.19
But current international law analysis leaves much doubt as to the
recognition of “digital territory” as an element of a state’s national
territory.20 Such analysis makes it difficult to recognize most
cyber-threats as attacks upon a state’s territory, which would allow
for self-defense and, what is more, the application of the
appropriate law of war (jus ad bellum) mechanisms.21 As a
remedy, numerous legal scholars are attempting to introduce a
plausible analogy that would apply territorially-based international
law to aterritorial cyberspace.22 One such recent attempt relies
upon a direct analogy to one of the pillars of modern international
law—the Westphalian order, which served as the stepping-stone
for contemporary international law.23
I. ORIGINS OF THE SOVEREIGN NATION-STATES REGIME
All wars, whether in land, air, sea or cyberspace, spell certain
doom. The era of the old kingdoms began its end on May 23, 1618
when Protestants from Bohemia threw two imperial governors
from the window of the castle in Prague.24 This marked the
beginning of the Thirty Years’ War.25 This war, which involved
both the Catholics and the Protestants, was a reflection of religious
19

See Victoria Ekstedt, Is the Swedish Territorial Defence Ordinance Applicable on
the Fourth Arena?, in 3RD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CYBER CONFLICT 61, 61–68
(C. Czosseck, Ė. Tyugu & T. Wingfield eds. 2011), available at http://www.ccdcoe.org/
publications/2011proceedings/2011_Proceedings.pdf.
20
Id. at 65–66.
21
But see Michael N. Schmitt, Bellum Americanum Revisited: U.S. Security Strategy
and the Jus ad Bellum, 176 MIL. L. REV. 364, 415–20 (2003) (extending existing
understandings of the application of jus ad bellum to cyber war).
22
See, e.g., Demchak & Dombrowski, supra note 6, at 32–35.
23
Id.
24
GEOFFREY PARKER, THE THIRTY YEARS’ WAR 48–49 (1987); C. V. WEDGWOOD, THE
THIRTY YEARS WAR 12, 78–79 (1939).
25
WEDGWOOD, supra note 24, at 12.

C04_KULESZA_BALLESTE (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

5/16/2013 1:26 PM

JUS INTERNET

1317

fanaticism and the ambitions of rulers.26 The war involved kings,
queens, the Holy Roman Emperor and the Pope.27 The butchery
and savagery of the Thirty Years’ War were catastrophic and
brought total misery, disease, famine, forced migration, devastated
economies, and deaths that reduced the population of central
Europe by one third.28 The war (1618–1648) ended when
European rulers agreed to a diplomatic solution.29 It was in the
year 1648 that a solution materialized with a series of treaties
known as the Peace of Westphalia.30 The peace process began in
1644 by representatives of nearly two hundred Catholic and
Protestant rulers, camped in Münster and Osnabrück, in the
northwestern German region of Westphalia.31 The series of
treaties, signed in Münster and Osnabrück, relied on a simple idea.
Within the forum of a first ever diplomatic conference, sovereigns
who had been fighting for three decades decided to recognize each
other as equals, with equal rights and obligations resting upon each
of them.32 Thus the Westphalian concept of state sovereignty was
born.
Most heads of states (i.e., sovereigns) agreed to govern the
communities they led within certain territorial boundaries, as
agreed upon in 1648.33 Crucial for this accord was the issue of
cultural values, as reflected in the religious beliefs underlying each
of the communities. Protestants and Catholics were deemed equal,
while Calvinism was legally recognized. In order to allow this
peaceful coexistence to happen, the concept of “sovereign states”

26

CARL SAGAN, COSMOS 51 (Ballantine Books 1985) (1980).
1 THOMAS A. WALKER, A HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS, 147–48 (1899).
28
STROBE TALBOTT, THE GREAT EXPERIMENT: THE STORY OF ANCIENT EMPIRES,
MODERN STATES, AND THE QUEST FOR A GLOBAL NATION 86 (2009).
29
Id. at 86–87.
30
WALKER, supra note 27, at 145–48.
31
TALBOTT, supra note 28 at 86.
32
Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648–1948, 42 AM. J. INT’L L. 20, 21–22, 40
(1948).
33
Stephen D. Krasner, Compromising Westphalia, 20 Int’l Security 115, 115 (1995);
see also Jouni Häkli, The Politics of Belonging: Complexities of Identity in the Catalan
Borderlands, 83 GEOGRAFISKA ANNALER B : HUMAN GEOGRAPHY 111, 112 (2001) (noting
that it took France and Spain 11 more years to find a satisfying consensus, embodied
within the Treaty of the Pyrenees of 1659).
27
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was introduced.34 The Westphalian accord allowed communities
to be governed in accordance with the common interest of the
state, understood as one separate and superior to those of the
sovereign, the king or the community itself.35 This idea was well
reflected by the term “raison d’état” (national interest),36 which
sought, in part, to protect the overall interests of, say, the French
state rather than those of the king or of the Catholic Church by
finding “a mean between what conscience permits and affairs
require.”37 Thus, state sovereignty meant that the nation-state
interest, rather than religious or personal motives, was to be the
guiding principle of all international relations.38
The Westphalian concept of sovereign states later developed
into the sovereignty of “nation-states,” laying the foundation for
contemporary international relations. “Nation states” would be
identified as communities formed by individuals with joint values,
history and culture rather than solely by a single sovereign’s
exercise of power over a group of individuals, as was the case with
“sovereign states.”39 The idea of “sovereign nation states,” derived
from the Westphalian order, required nation-states to coexist
peacefully through allowing each community to exercise its
common culture and beliefs, communicate in common languages
and govern themselves in a way they found appropriate within
certain territorial limits, as agreed upon by the nation-states.40 It
must be noted that the current evolution of international relations
has led several political and legal writers to conclude that we are

34

See Juliane Kokott, States, Sovereign Equality, in THE MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA
(Heidelberg and Oxford Univ. Press 2013).
35
See W. ANDY KNIGHT, A CHANGING UNITED NATIONS: MULTILATERAL EVOLUTION
AND THE QUEST FOR GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 75–77 (2000). See generally Peace Treaty
between the Holy Roman Emperor and the King of France and their respective Allies, the
Avalon Project, Yale Law School, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/
westphal.asp.
36
See generally W.F. CHURCH, RICHELIEU AND REASON OF STATE (1973) (discussing
the history and application of “raison d’état”).
37
Id. at 168 (quoting Silhon).
38
See id at 171.
39
See J. Samuel Barkin & Bruce Cronin, The State and the Nation: Changing Norms
and the Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations, 48 INT’L ORG. 107, 110 (1994).
40
See id. at 115–17.
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 6
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experiencing the dusk of the Westphalian order.41 Globalization
and new media, as enabled primarily through the popularization of
the global network, bringing instantaneous communication
worldwide and promoting similar commercial and social trends all
over the globe, clearly lead to the conclusion that a rigid
Westphalian distinction among nations, communities and societies
is no longer legitimate nor executable.42 “Sovereignty”—a term
crucial to the architecture of the Westphalian regime—is being
substituted by its derivatives, such as “shared sovereignty,” and
amended to a much narrower scope with such international law
instruments as peremptory norms or humanitarian intervention.43
Therefore its re-introduction for the cyber-sphere seems
particularly ill-suited.
II. ATERRITORIAL CYBERSPACE VS. WESTPHALIAN ORDER
The proposed legal concept of the “cybered Westphalian age”
for the Internet is based on the perception that “no frontier lasts
forever, and no freely occupied global commons extends endlessly
where human societies are involved.”44 This concept is flawed for
two main reasons: the analogy utilized is inaccurate, and its legal
analysis is incomplete. The suggestion that a frontier must be
subject to a limitative unit of measurement is a legacy of the old
order of Westphalia. In our day and age, there are new frontiers
that can be established and others that will never be crossed. For
example, this “frontier” analogy cannot be easily applied to outer
41
See James A. Caporaso, Changes in the Westphalian Order: Territory, Public
Authority, and Sovereignty, 2 INT’L STUD. REV., 1 (2000); Mark Purcell, Citizenship and
the Right to the Global City: Reimagining the Capitalist World Order, 27 INT’L J. URB. &
REG’L RESEARCH 564, 571 (2003); John Gerard Ruggie, Territoriality and Beyond:
Problematizing Modernity in International Relations, 47 INT’L ORG. 139, 139–40 (1993).
42
See generally Steven Wheatley, Democratic Governance Beyond the State: The
Legitimacy of Non-State Actors as Standard Setters, in NON-STATE ACTORS AS
STANDARD SETTERS 218 (2009) (explaining that in the realm of traditional sovereign lawmaking, international governance by non-state actors stands outside the Westphalian
order). .
43
See Stephen D. Krasner, The Case for Shared Sovereignty, 16 J. DEMOCRACY 69, 70
(2005); Stephen D. Krasner, The Hole in the Whole: Sovereignty, Shared Sovereignty,
and International Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1075 (2004).
44
Demchak & Dombrowski, supra note 6, at 32.
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space.45 Science has shown that the frontier of an infinite Universe
may continue without end.46 Indeed, the fact that we measure
distances in outer space in billions of light years dwarfs any notion
of a frontier, such as the American frontier, with recognized
geographical limits. Similarly, any comparison of the Internet to
the American frontier, as has been suggested,47 would be too
simplistic. On the other hand, the “cybered Westphalian age”
proposition, as defined within the legal context of a frontier, is
based on the idea that “good fences are erected to make good
neighbors,” even in cyberspace.48 This premise ignores the value
of the “global commons” recognized by legally designating regions
of valuable resources as protected for the enjoyment of all
peoples.49 Outer space is an example.50 Any model of governance
designed to place national borders within the Internet only
considers the practical aspects of governance, focuses too narrowly
on the short-term, and fails to resolve the long-term conflict.
While it is much easier to accept the benefits of “placing fences,”
the ultimate goal should be a promotion of the principles enshrined
in natural law that direct governments to carefully study the
benefits owed to humanity.
The ultimate benefits for humanity are clearly delineated in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.51 This declaration asserts
that a new respect is needed to promote greater opportunities for
humanity, by reshaping the classical nation-state sovereignty and
focusing on developing a global society.52 While the Internet must
be understood as operating within the realities of our present legal
world, existing positive laws must be formulated in accordance

45

Cf. FRANCIS LYALL & PAUL B. LARSEN, SPACE LAW: A TREATISE 164–65 (2009)
(discussing the absurdity of having state sovereignty extend infinitely into space, pointing
out the difficulty in establishing a border, and questioning whether a border is necessary).
46
See generally ARCHIVES OF THE UNIVERSE (MARCIA BARTUSIAK ed., 2004).
47
See, e.g., DOROTHY E. DENNING & PETER J. DENNING, INTERNET BESIEGED, at vii
(1997).
48
Demchak & Dombrowski, supra note 6, at 32.
49
See SUSAN J. BUCK, THE GLOBAL COMMONS: AN INTRODUCTION 1–2 (1998).
50
Id. at 1.
51
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
52
Id.
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with the ultimate benefit to humanity.53 New laws are needed to
promote greater opportunities for humanity, by stepping away
from classical nation-state sovereignty and looking at developing a
global public trust.54
Cyber attacks open up the nation-state to questions of state
responsibility in international human rights law. The “cybered
Westphalian age” proposition argues that cyberspace is
experiencing the beginnings of an international “border-making
process.”55 The fact that the Internet has experienced increased
government activity seeking to “control access” or exert
censorship, depending on the circumstances, including a rise of
Internet filtering, does not necessarily reflect a positive exercise of
sovereignty over the virtual world.56 Government responses to
cyber-attacks require a careful understanding of the attribution
element and constant recognition that the Internet is a peaceful
instrument of global communications.57
As the right to free expression is not imposed through a
peremptory norm, restrictions thereto should only be introduced
within the limits set out by international law. The U.N. Human
Rights Council Resolution 12/1658 on freedom of opinion and
expression prohibits States Parties from imposing restrictions on
the right to access and use information on the Internet.
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that actively protecting the
right to free speech online might be somewhat of a challenge. The
current procedures (international complaints procedure and special
procedures) created within the United Nations for the protection of
human rights are initiated in principle by the Human Rights
53

KEMAL BASLAR, THE CONCEPT OF THE COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 21 (1998).
54
Id. at 371.
55
Demchak & Dombrowski, supra note 6, at 32.
56
Id at 47.
57
See Erik M. Mudrinich, Cyber 3.0: The Department of Defense Strategy for
Operating in Cyberspace and the Attribution Problem, 68 A.F. L. REV. 167, 205–06
(2012) (discussing what the author calls the “sixth element strategic initiative” and the
importance of attributing a cyber-attack correctly).
58
Human Rights Council Res. 12/16, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights,
Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to
Development, 12th Sess., Oct. 12, 2009, U.N. GAOR, A/HRC/RES/12/16, 5(p)(iii) (Oct.
12, 2009).
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Council, which currently is dominated by African and Islamic
countries,59 which are often supported by Russia and China,60 both
of which restrict freedom of speech. In this context, the chance of
obtaining international sanctioning authority for actions against
extensive censorship practices appears slim.
Without such
authorization, any action aimed at those extensively limiting
freedom of speech online would be deemed inconsistent with
international law.
At the same time, one can identify a growing accord that
excessive filtering is contrary to the globally agreed free speech
standard, as per Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights,61 and discussions are being initiated to identify the details
of that standard for the online environment. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, which provides that “all human
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights,”62 is the point
of departure for Internet governance (IG). For example, the U.N.
Human Rights Council’s resolution on promotion, protection and
enjoyment of human rights on the Internet was based, in part, on
article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.63
Further, during the 2007 Internet Governance Forum in Brazil, the
Council of Europe noted that “[f]reedom of expression and
security on the Internet are not contradictory but complementing
values in the information society.”64
Proponents of a cybered Westphalian age argue, “As
cyberspace is profoundly man-made, no impossible barriers hinder
59

Robert Evans, U.N. Chief Tells Rights Body Drop Rhetoric, Blocs, REUTERS
(Dec. 12, 2008, 2:27 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/12/12/us-un-rightsidUSTRE4BB67820081212; see also Membership of the Human Rights Council, OFFICE
OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (OHCHR),
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/Membership.aspx (last visited May 10,
2013) (listing the council’s current membership).
60
Evans, supra note 59.
61
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 51, art. 19.
62
Id. art. 1.
63
Human Rights Council Res. 20/8, The Promotion, Protection and Enjoyment of
Human Rights on the Internet,20th Sess., June 29, 2012, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/20/L.13 (July
7, 2012).
64
Freedom of Expression and Security on the Internet, UNESCO (Nov. 14, 2007),
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/media-services/single-view/news/freedom_of_expression
_and_security_on_the_internet-2.
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the growth of national borders in cyberspace. They are possible
technologically, comfortable psychologically, and manageable
systematically and politically.”65 In spite of this, the recent report
from the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection
of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, contended that
the Internet is key to the exercising of the right to freedom of
opinion and expression, as guaranteed by article 19 of the
Universal Declaration and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR).66 The ICCPR states that the right to
freedom of expression includes the freedom to receive and impart
information of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, through any media
of choice.67 Human Rights Committee General Comment 10 has
emphasized the obligation of nations to protect the right to freedom
of expression, which includes freedom to “impart information and
ideas of all kinds,” and the freedom to seek and receive them
regardless of frontiers and the medium utilized.68 A common
understanding ought to be developed that filtering or privacylimiting measures should be limited as potential violations of
human rights, in particular the right to freedom of expression in the
cyber-world.69 It must be acknowledged that the right to freedom
of opinion and expression functions as an “enabler” of other rights,

65

Demchak & Dombrowski, supra note 6, at 35.
See Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of
Opinion and Expression, Key Trends and Challenges to the Right of all Individuals to
Seek, Receive and Impart Information and Ideas of all Kinds Through the Internet,
Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/27 (May 16, 2011) [hereinafter Report on
Internet Freedom] (by Frank La Rue).
67
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art.
19(2), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966).
68
U.N. Human Rights Comm., CCPR General Comment No. 10: Freedom of
Expression (Art. 19), 19th Sess. (June 29, 1983), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/
doc.nsf/0/2bb2f14bf558182ac12563ed0048df17.
69
The right to access information is an essential element of the right to free speech.
According to Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the right of free
expression consists of three constitutive elements: 1) the freedom to hold opinions
without interference, 2) the right to receive information and ideas expressed by others and
3) the right to impart information and ideas. See supra note 51, art. 19. Freedom of
speech, in all these respects, can be exercised, according to the cited document, through
“any media and regardless of frontiers.” Id. In the same way the freedom of speech is
defined in hard documents of international law (i.e., Article 19 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). Report on Internet Freedom, supra 66, ¶ 20.
66
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including the right to education necessary for the enjoyment of the
benefits of scientific progress, as well as civil and political rights.70
To recognize the changing nature of the Internet, the Cybered
Westphalian proponents chose the crossing of the Rubicon as a
metaphor evoking Julius Caesar’s famous river crossing on his
way to Rome from Gaul.71 For the proponents, the phrase
“crossing the Rubicon” seems to mean a new historical landmark,
and one pointing toward warfare.72 The political landscape of the
Roman Republic certainly changed after Julius Caesar crossed the
Rubicon River with his army in 49 BCE.73 The Cybered
Westphalian proponents noted a change in the landscape of the
Internet and compared it with the story of the Stuxnet worm attack,
branded as the “modern” Rubicon.74 But if the crossing of the
Rubicon must be the metaphor, then the Stuxnet worm is not the
other landmark that we must embrace. Certainly, the Stuxnet
technological sophistication, although memorable, dwarfs in
comparison with the events in Italy that would define human
history for at least five hundred years.75 But it is rather by opening
the Internet forever that humanity will cross the Rubicon, by
making the hard choices that will define our global civilization.
While the past reflects an image of a Westphalian model of
multilateralism where the nation-state has enjoyed a privileged and
unquestioned position, the present reminds of a rising model of
governance—multistakeholderism. Multistakeholder systems take
a step back and seek to improve an atmosphere of endless military
conflicts, lack of educational opportunities, the disregard for
human innovation, censorship, and other threats such as spam,
phishing and DDoS attacks.
These threats have damaged
somewhat the credibility of the Internet as a platform for human
development and have called into question governments’ ability to
protect the citizens they claim to protect.
70

Report on Internet Freedom, supra note 66, ¶ 22.
H. H. SCULLARD, FROM THE GRACCHI TO NERO: A HISTORY OF ROME FROM 133 B.C.
TO A.D. 68, 121–22, 134–35 (2007).
72
Demchak & Dombrowski, supra note 6, at 32.
73
SCULLARD, supra note 71, at 121–22.
74
Demchak & Dombrowski, supra note 6, at 32.
75
SCULLARD, supra note 71, at 121–23.
71
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The future, however, offers humanity a multistakeholder order
rising to face new challenges and to open new opportunities. It is
here that cyberspace encounters the reality of a new landscape in
international law, requiring that as a process of decision and
participation, not only nation-states, but now a much wider range
of actors should require consideration.76 Legal multistakeholder
actors77 exist as participants stemming from the analysis based on
past decisions, while attempting to participate in the course of
future decisions.78 If history is to be utilized as a cyberspace
analogy, then we must look toward ancient times for illumination.
It was the Roman Empire that offered the world the foundations of
the contemporary international legal regime, jus gentium (later
developed into the law of the nations).79
III. CYBERSPACE AS A REGULATORY CHALLENGE
The wave of demonstrations in countries across the Middle
East and North Africa in 2011 showed that the Internet now plays a
mobilizing role in the population regarding “justice, equality,
accountability and better respect for human rights.”80 It is here that
we face the reality of a renewed international dimension where a
much wider range of actors now have a voice within the decision-

76
Id at 19 (Those actors “included national and international officials, the elites of
non-governmental organizations running the gamut from those concerned with wealth
through to those concerned with religious rectitude, transnational business entities, gangs
and terrorists, and individuals.”).
77
The stakeholders represent the participants or actors in the Internet governance
debate: governments, private sector, civil society, United Nations family agencies, and
international organizations (NGOs).
78
See W. Michael Reisman, The Democratization of Contemporary International
Law-Making Process and the Differentiation of Their Application, in DEVELOPMENTS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TREATY MAKING 15–19 (Rüdiguer Wolfrum & Volker Röben,
eds. 2005).
79
See MANFRED LACHS, THE TEACHER IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 39–44 (1987) (on jus
naturale genesis). See generally Stanislas F. Belch, Paulus Vladimiri and his Doctrine
Concerning International Law and Politics, 176 REVUE DE L’HISTOIRE DES RELIGIONS 225
(1969); LUDWIK EHRLICH, WORKS OF PAUL WLADIMIRI (1969); Mark Goldie, Edmund
Bohun and Ius Gentium in the Revolution Debate, 1689–1693, 20 THE HIST. J. 569
(1977).
80
Report on Internet Freedom, supra note 66, ¶ 2.
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making process.81 The legal power of the individual, enhanced by
new communication technologies, has created the opportunity for
meaningful individual participation in key aspects of international
decisions, even where these individuals are not affiliated with
governments.82 By focusing on the “nation-state,” the Cybered
Westphalian approach is less likely to appreciate and more likely
to interfere with the roles that are played by individuals and groups
in the formation and continuation of the Internet governance
process. Governments should avoid isolation and must strive for
an international consensus of joint cooperation for the benefit of
the “citizens” of the Internet. Governments must accept that the
Internet is not a source in itself of “moral decline.”83 The main
contours of contemporary societal confusion are based on “fears,
which take form in dystopian rhetorics,” bringing about moral
panic “in which anxieties over uncontrollable social forces become
the focus of efforts to understand a new cultural trend.”84 Indeed,
good arguments support the view that the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights has had a constitutional quality ab initio.85 Human
rights concepts may be identified within the Internet as a cultural
necessity of progression toward a common good, and one that
seeks out strategies to balance the weight of power while
identifying greater degrees of participation within the decisionmaking process for all “citizens” of the Internet: the netizens.86 As
a result, the fraught relationship between national sovereignty
interests and common practices of cyber-communities deserves to
be analyzed through the prism of international law before the
predictions of a cybered Internet can be fully validated. Therefore,
it is the nation-state that ultimately must prove its legitimacy as the
good steward and protector of the most interesting and sustained
grand development of inspiration: the international law of the
81

See Reisman, supra note 78, at 19.
See Reisman, Wiessner & Willard, supra note 2.
83
See NANCY K. BAYM, PERSONAL CONNECTIONS IN THE DIGITAL AGE 41–44 (2010).
84
Id. at 41, 43.
85
See Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in
National and International Law, 25 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 287, 289–290 (1996).
86
The term introduced by Michael Hauben to describe an active participant of the
global electronic exchange. See MICHAEL HAUBEN & RONDA HAUBEN, NETIZENS: ON THE
HISTORY AND IMPACT OF USENET AND THE INTERNET (1997).
82
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Internet. This law, one that must, as has been discussed,
incorporate human dignity, “is surely inseparable from the
question of what it is to be human.”87
The netizen, it could be argued, exists in an environment that
has witnessed the evolution of rules that continue to limit the old
Westphalian order. To broaden the basis of the decision-making
process within the Internet requires that netizens be given
uninhibited control over their roles according to their
responsibilities within the world community. Thus, the practical
aspect of any new regime needs to be based on established legal
practices of international relations that enshrine human dignity.
These factors, as well as the sui generis aspects of the Internet,
were considered in the 1997 United States Supreme Court case of
Reno v. ACLU, where the Court recognized the distinctiveness of
the Internet as a structure that provides “a wide variety of
communication and information retrieval methods.”88 The Court
noted that all of these methods, taken as a whole, constituted a
unique medium, known to its users as cyberspace, and “located in
no particular geographical location but available to anyone,
anywhere in the world, with access to the Internet.”89 Two years
later, the concept of cyberspace as a community was explored.90
In this environment of netizens, cooperation has produced public
goods that benefit the collective.91 This new cyber-person, the
netizen, has been represented by all stakeholder groups.92 This
cyber-environment acquired a new identity after the 2003 first
phase of the World Summit on the Information Society, under the
name of “the Information Society.”93 This environment is one of
87

See Jeff Malpas, Human Dignity and Human Being, in PERSPECTIVE ON HUMAN
DIGNITY 19 (2007).
88
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 851, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2334 (1997).
89
Id at 851, 117 S. Ct. at 2334–35.
90
See Marc Smith & Peter Kollock, Communities in Cyberspace, in COMMUNITIES IN
CYBERSPACE 16–18, (Marc Smith & Peter Kollock eds., 1999).
91
Peter Kollock, The Economies of Online Cooperation: Gifts and Public Goods in
Cyberspace, in COMMUNITIES IN CYBERSPACE 225–31, (Marc Smith & Peter Kollock eds.,
1999).
92
See Rolf Weber, Accountability in Internet Governance, 13 Int’l J. Comm. L. &
Pol’y 152, 159 (2009).
93
Id.

C04_KULESZA_BALLESTE (DO NOT DELETE)

1328

5/16/2013 1:26 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 23:1311

unique properties and unique social relationships.94 It is here that
the netizens continue to explore this electronic frontier living by
rough consensus and running code.95 Indeed, it is a global social
system of coexistence and interactions.96
The democratic ideals of cyber-communities are directly
related to the realities of the legal order of the Internet. Without a
doubt, open cyber-communities are likely to be extremely diverse,
and it is within their own inner workings that the management of
the Internet takes center stage.97 The fact is that short of
disconnecting a nation completely from the Internet, all other
measures would fail to achieve an over-all defense without
sacrificing the technological benefits owed to the people of the
nation.
Yet, what is the purpose of any defensive policy? Should this
policy be one where the nation-state agrees to subscribe to
recognized precepts of international law, but later disregard them
when faced with having to adjust its domestic law to be consistent
with international law? The answer should be that any policy of
national cybersecurity that claims legitimacy must first subscribe
to international human rights standards, which possess a global
quality empowered by natural law as the foundation of the human
trait that continues to give international law its direct connection to
the well-being of both the human person and the nation-state.98 It
is not surprising then that legitimacy is inextricably linked with
power.99
For the nation-state, legitimacy is based on a system of
asymmetric power, in which “the actions of those who rule are
accepted voluntarily by those who are ruled because the latter are
convinced that the actions of the former conform to pre-established
94
Hans Klein, The Right to Political Participation and the Information Society, in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL INFORMATION SOCIETY 190 (Rikke Frank Jørgensen ed.,
2006).
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
HOWARD RHEINGOLD, THE VIRTUAL COMMUNITY: HOMESTEADING ON THE
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 340 (2000).
98
See GROTIUS, supra note 15, at 53.
99
M. Patrick Cottrell, Hope or Hype? Legitimacy and US Leadership in a Global Age,
7 FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS 339 (2011).
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norms.”100 Although it would be quite easy to visualize the
Internet as a chaotic environment replete with visions of vandals
and pirates, the truth is that the Internet is not as chaotic or as
critically lawless as these visions would suggest. The impression
that the threat to the nation-state is centralized in cyber-attacks is a
fiction. The truth is that it is unscrupulous individuals serving their
own interests that abuse the Internet and create the threats that
need to be stopped. The truth is that cyberspace continues to
operate as expected, first as a source of information, and second as
a potential promoter of human dignity.101 Cyberspace has its own
set of rules and principles, in the majority of cases reflect the “reallife” laws. This phenomenon helps it to keep its integrity and
coherence, although real-world rules often show to be insufficient,
when confronted with the challenges posed by cyberspace. The
majority of those challenges reflects the global system of human
rights and underlines the urgent need for their efficient
protection.102
The idea of the netizen is a direct consequence of the very
nature of cyberspace. The Internet, being a network of peers, runs
based on equal participation of all stakeholders.103 This basic
truth, recognized by the WSIS within its 2003 Declaration of
Principles (item 17) is known at the principle of
multistakeholderism.104 WSIS defined it by confirming that
“building an inclusive Information Society requires new forms of
solidarity, partnership and cooperation among governments and
other stakeholders (i.e., the private sector) civil society and
international organizations.”105
Deriving from the WSIS
declaration, the 2005 WSIS Tunis Agenda sets the stage for the
creation of the Internet Governance Forum as “a new forum for

100

Id. at 339–40.
Report on Internet Freedom, supra note 66.
102
Id.
103
See About the Internet Governance Forum, INTERNET GOVERNANCE FORUM,
http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/aboutigf (last visited April 16, 2013).
104
WSIS, Geneva 2003, Declaration of Principles, U.N. Doc. WSIS03/GENEVA/DOC/4-E (Dec. 12, 2003), available at http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs/
geneva/official/dop.html.
105
Id.
101
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multi-stakeholder policy dialogue.”106 Today the principle of
multistakeholderism may be defined as an equal involvement of all
groups participating in the Internet’s evolution: state authorities
(whether acting directly or through intergovernmental
organizations), individuals or organizations acting on behalf of the
civil society, and last but not least the business sector (including
not only the ICT sector but any other market segment).107 The
multi-stakeholder character of Internet governance makes it unique
in the world of international relations. This basic characteristic
determines any possible corresponding legal regulation. In the IG
field it is no longer governments alone that have to come to a
consensus. It is the nation-state engendered with authority, but
tempered by responsibility, that must apply that authority holding
in mind the best interests of humanity and without resort to any use
of coercion.108
Multi-stakeholderism necessitates the re-composition of the
stakeholders involved in the global consensus-seeking processes.
Territoriality is no longer an issue nor can it serve as criteria for
the composition of such stakeholder groups, unlike a shared
opinion or agenda.109 Cyberspace also allows for more versatile
but equal participation. In the “real-world,” two citizenships held
simultaneously are usually considered more than enough, while in
cyberspace the common standard is for all “netizens” to participate
in numerous communities at the same time, fluctuating among and
between them. Therefore, the nature of the cyber-realm is far
different in its composition and governance regime than the
traditional, historic political world-order decided upon in 1648.
The concept of replacing the global cyberspace with a web of
small, well-guarded national networks seems appealing for a
number of reasons. Not only might it enable more security, but it

106

WSIS, Tunis 2005, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society, U.N. Doc. WSIS05/TUNIS/DOC/6(Rev. 1)-E, item 72 (Nov. 18, 2005), available at http://www.itu.int/
wsis/docs2/tunis/off/6rev1.html.
107
The Tunis Agenda introduced the concept of the multi-stakeholder process as the
future standard for Internet governance.
108
See Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, Jurisprudence for a Free Society
1245 (1992).
109
See supra note 78.
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could also enable the more efficient enforcement of human rights.
Human rights such as freedom of speech or privacy, although
enshrined in numerous international documents and clarified in
court decisions, still differ in application at the national legislative
and judicial level. Ineffective international privacy protection,
resulting from divergent interpretations of the content of the
privacy right in various legal systems, points to the need to
intensify international collaboration in times of global electronic
exchange, which continuously expose new risks to privacy.
Making cyberspace just one more element of national territory,
guarded with (electronic) frontiers would allow exercise of those
national human rights standards efficiently, and solve the growing
problem of finding a global standard for free speech or online
privacy. The challenge of successfully protecting individual
privacy might serve to demonstrate the shortcoming of the cyberWestphalian order.
The problem with privacy protection online is twofold. First,
there is the abovementioned lack of a universal accord on the
status of personal data protection. Since the scope of the right to
privacy is primarily shaped by the acknowledged scope of
protected personal data, the diverse status of privacy regimes in
various jurisdictions leads to the actual ineffectiveness of any
national or international personal data protection online because it
may not be effectively exercised.110 The second problem with
protecting privacy online is the very definition of “privacy.” Even
the EU states, proud of their human right protection regime, find it
difficult to define the scope of privacy protection when faced with
such new challenges as the legal status of data presented by
Google Street View or other geolocation data111 and Google’s
possible legal responsibility in Europe for infringing users’
privacy.
Introducing national, territorial jurisdiction over particular
“spaces” in cyberspace would not only help solve those difficult
110

See generally, Frank La Rue, supra note 66.
See Data Protection Working Party, Article 29: Opinion 13/2011 on Geolocation
Services on Smart Mobile Devices, 881/11/EN WP 185 (May 16, 2011), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinionrecommendation/files/2011/wp185_en.pdf
111
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problems, but would also make the work of ISPs much easier.
They would no longer have to make difficult decisions on their
own company standards for protecting privacy of their users at a
“sufficient” (from a legal and moral point of view, in the global
context) level. All they would have to do would be to meet the
national standards in “national” networks, a challenge international
companies have successfully faced for decades in the “real” world,
operating in multiple state territories through their branch offices.
What is wrong with this—optimistic, as it might seem—
scenario? Cyber-balkanization is a term used to describe the
process of the global network falling into a set of smaller,
community-based groups of users. The Westphalian order for
cyberspace proposes to make this process the official practice. The
Westphalian order for cyberspace represents a point in Internet
history of losing the freedom and interoperability of the
information exchange, while gaining security of individual users—
one granted by national laws of the state of their residence.
National authorities would have the tools to effectively protect
their residents’ rights (e.g., privacy), but those residents would lose
most of their freedom within the process.
What is however most problematic is that under a Westphalian
regime the network would lose its interoperability. In the
Westphalian cyber-world there no longer is a global “cloud” of
information, only separate spaces guarded with electronic tools and
governed by national laws. They are connected through narrow,
scrupulously controlled “gates,” where exchange of information
takes place, just as is the case with traditional borders or postal
packages today. The cyber-Westphalian era would take us back to
a seventeenth century Internet. It would strip us of the very value
of the information society we are now trying to protect, since there
would no longer be a global space for intellectual exchange,
despite allegedly offering a sense of security. Benjamin Franklin’s
thought rings true once more: “The man who trades freedom for
security does not deserve nor will he ever receive either.”112
Should we give up the potential for free thought that the global

112

Quote attributed to Benjamin Franklin, POOR RICHARD’S ALMANACK (1738).
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information society provides us for a false pretense of “national”
security, we are actually bound to lose both.
IV. A RECOMMENDATION: JUS INTERNET—THE JUS GENTIUM FOR
CYBERSPACE
The assertion that territorial law does not fit the transnational
nature of cyberspace is not new. In 1996, D. R. Johnson and D. G.
Post stated that as a fact, traditional jurisdiction and democracy are
not fit for regulating cyberspace.113 They accurately noted that the
Internet “radically subverts a system of rule-making based on
borders between physical spaces, at least with respect to the claim
that cyberspace should naturally be governed by territorially
defined rules.”114 With their controversial observation they added
to the rising wave of cyberspace law criticism.115 Not discouraged,
they amended their concept in a 1998 follow-up entitles “The New
‘Civic Virtue’ of the Internet.”116 They described a detailed
proposal for governing the ungovernable—a deeply democratic
“Complex Systems Model for the Governance of Cyberspace”
based on a common “civic virtue,”117 instead of using statutory law
and territorial state jurisdiction for governing the transboundary
and international cyberspace.118 The model rose to the challenge
posed by cyberspace by offering a new, tailor-made regulatory
solution rather than an analogy-based application of traditional
laws.119
113

See generally supra note 18.
Id. at 1370.
115
See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 207, 207–08 (1996).
116
David R. Johnson & David G. Post, The New “Civic Virtue” of the Internet; A
Complex Systems Model for the Governance of Cyberspace, in THE EMERGING INTERNET
(C. Firestone ed., 1998), available at http://www.temple.edu/lawschool/dpost/
Newcivicvirtue.html.
117
Id. They derive their concept from the idea of “civic virtue” underlying
representative democracy. Paraphrasing Jeffrey Abramson, the authors conclude that the
core of civic virtue is the ennobling of men and women, when included in democratic
processes. Those men and women “(whether acting as voters or representatives) are . . .
casting aside narrow, selfish, or factional interests and putting themselves in the special
frame of mind known as ‘good citizenship.’” Id.
118
Id.
119
Id.
114
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Post and Johnson identified particular principles reflected in all
online communities and recognized the legal and practical meaning
of electronic (rather than physical) boundaries.120 This combined
legal and practical approach could help identify and separately
govern “areas” of cyberspace. Such areas, “occupied” by cybercommunities, understood as groups of Internet users sharing
common ethical standards, would resemble traditional societies in
cyberspace.121 Rather than seeking a universal compromise for a
statutory law consensus, the authors offered “a form of civic virtue
that can tolerate continuous conflict and can reside in the very
architecture of a decentralized, diverse, complex adaptive
system.”122 Values common to all the communities would
constitute a narrow catalog of globally shared principles, created
“from the bottom up.”123 Community members would be bound
by the values shared by the individual online communities they
decide to join, just as residents are obliged to respect the national
laws of their countries of residence upon crossing a border.124
Rules shared by all of the communities would then allow
identification of a narrow set of characteristics defining the “civic
virtue.” Such set of standards, based on practical and applicable
consensus, would be the foundation for online governance.
Critics, however, blamed the authors for lacking a sense of
reality.125 Post and Johnson argued that the system would work
based solely on the internalization and legitimization of the values
enshrined within the civic virtue.126 They argued that once the
governed accepted the values as their own (internalized them) and
recognized them as law that rightfully could be enforced in the
name of the community (legitimized them) the system would
work.127 The critics claimed there was no power, authority or
motivation to safeguard the execution of these ethical principles,
120

Id.
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
E.g., A. L. Shapiro, The Disappearance of Cyberspace and the Rise of Code, 8
SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 703, 709 (1998).
126
See Johnson & Post, supra note 116.
127
Id.
121
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and therefore no possibility to raise them to the level of an
efficiently working legal system.128
It would be difficult, one might admit, to conceive of online
communities that could be governed by individuals so morally
stringent as not to give into the temptations authority brings.129
And the civic virtue concept partook of one crucial flaw—it was
against the egotistic human nature. However, time brought a
practical solution to this crucial challenge: the future brought the
“hybrid economy.” This concept is discussed in detail by
Lawrence Lessig in his latest book, Remix (with a revealing
subtitle: Making Art and Commerce Thrive in the Hybrid
Economy),130 and by Benkler131 in Wealth of Networks.132 Lessig
argues that the hybrid economy is the economic model best suited
to reflect current trends in global online interaction.133 According
to him, a hybrid economy combines elements of two wellestablished economic models: the commercial economy, which
conceives of the value of goods or services only in terms of
money, and the sharing economy, exemplified by love or
friendship, invaluable in hard currency.134
The originally
dichotomous classification, where an individual relationship would
be either commercial or sharing, was severely disrupted by the
activities “netizens” undertook.135 Online communities organized
in ways completely foreign to the off-line reality.136 Netizens
“shared” their free time, knowledge, ideas, offered each other

128

See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1200
(1998).
129
See KATHY BOWREY, LAW AND INTERNET CULTURES 24–31 (2005) (discussing the
“mapping” of cybercommunities); cf. ROLF H. WEBER ET AL., SHAPING INTERNET
GOVERNANCE 22 (Springer 2010) (pointing to the problem of “free riders” not ready and
unwilling to collaborate on equal basis within the egalitarian society).
130
LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID
ECONOMY (2008).
131
Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of
Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273, 341 (2004).
132
YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS (2006).
133
LESSIG, supra note 130, at 248–49, 294.
134
Id. at 118.
135
See id. at 177–85.
136
See id. at 225–26.
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companionship and support—free of charge.137 However, as time
proved and experience showed, such free sharing also brought
tremendous commercial success. Wikipedia and Linux, for
example, were initiated by few enthusiasts with some free time and
now are flourishing enterprises operating on hard currency. That’s
how a hybrid economy works.138 It combines the uncombinable—
what once was “sharing” could now be evaluated “commercially.”
Benkler adds to this concept by redefining the role of price in a
world ruled by a hybrid economy.139 In sharing economies price
does not play any part—that role had to be adopted by a different
Deriving from his earlier work, in Wealth of
feature.140
Networks,141 Benkler envisioned a new phase in social evolution:
the era of network information economy, based upon what he calls
“peer production.”142 The concept covers generating new
resources, ones not calculable with money.143 According to his
diagnosis, peer production will soon rule world markets.144
Benkler and Lessig argue that neither laws nor commercial barriers
can halt this unfolding revolution.145 As Lessig rightfully points
out, the “past survives only if it can beat out the future.”146 As he
goes on to reassume, national authorities and certain professional
lobbies clinging to outdated legal concepts cannot succeed.147 Not
only because their demands are irrational, but mainly, because
they’re not pragmatic. Among those concepts, the reintroduction
of territorial jurisdiction in cyberspace may be named. A similar
notion seems noticeable in the new mapping of cyberspace
provided for by David Post in his latest work.148
137

See id.
See generally id. at 226–49.
139
Benkler, supra note 131, at 275–76.
140
See id. at 282.
141
BENKLER, supra note 132.
142
Benkler, supra note 131, at 330–31, 334.
143
BENKLER, supra note 132, at 115–16.
144
Id. at 131.
145
See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 130 at 266–68 (discussing these limitations in
copyright law).
146
Id. at 142.
147
Id.
148
See DAVID POST, IN SEARCH OF JEFFERSON’S MOOSE – NOTES ON THE STATE IN
CYBERSPACE (2009).
138
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Benkler rightfully points out that the goal of a contemporary
government is to assess the needs of and values crucial to its
community.149 Since that community is reaching beyond state
borders, corresponding solutions must be sought. In times of
economic and cultural globalization it is necessary to look for
global solutions, and one might be offered by looking into the
ancient concept of universal jus naturale. It was thought of as
combining rules and values recognized throughout all
communities.150 Benkler sees the era of globalization and peer
production as a unique opportunity to reassess the values
universally recognized.151 This implication may be considered a
reference to the turning point in international law history. As
already mentioned, a hybrid economy covers both commercial and
sharing economies. A mechanism best suited for governing it
ought therefore to derive from two sets of values, specific to each
of them respectively. Statutory law governs monetary exchange in
commercial economies, while ethics and codes of conduct allow
for the even operation of sharing economies. Since a hybrid
economy comprises both, commercial and free, therefore both law
and ethics respectively must be considered when drafting a
regulatory standard for the hybrid economy in cyberspace. Jus
Internet is just that proposal, realistically combining both the areas.
Jus Internet derives from Roman jus gentium, built upon values
recognized by all people, originating from natural law (jus
naturale).152 Created as a fundamental framework, jus gentium
was designed to govern interactions among and between
individuals from numerous diverse provinces of the Roman
Empire.153 All inhabitants of the Roman Empire—much like all
149

See generally BENKLER, supra note 132.
See, e.g., A. ARTHUR SCHILLER, ROMAN LAW: MECHANISMS OF DEVELOPMENT 560
(1978); Brian Tierney, Vitoria and Suarez on Ius Gentium, Natural Law, and Custom, in
THE NATURE OF CUSTOMARY LAW 110–16 (Amanda Perreau-Saussine & James B.
Murphy eds., 2007).
151
See Benkler, supra note 131, at 328.
152
Kokott & Hoffmeister, supra note 12, ¶ 2.
153
The principles of jus gentium were applied to relations between foreigners (ones not
holding Roman citizenship) and Roman citizens. Roman citizens’ interactions were
regulated by the statutory law—jus civile. See Roderick A. Macdonald, Metaphors of
Multiplicity: Civil Society, Regimes and Legal Pluralism, 15 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 69,
74–75 (1998); see also Berta Esperanza Hernández-Truyol, International Law, Human
150
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netizens—came from different cultural and historical
backgrounds.154 They had to coincide while entering economic
transactions or otherwise interacting. Jus gentium served as a
basic set of references for settling disputes arising out of such
interactions.155 The system relied on a basic, humane sense of
justice and fairness.156 Its theory derived from two values: trust
(fides) and equity (aequitas).157 When identifying particular norms
two regulatory systems were evoked: jus naturale and religious
law.158 Initially jus gentium operated as a common custom,
eventually taking on the role of binding customary law.159 The
general character of its norms and its versatile application brought
it authority among various cultures and social systems.160
Although the Roman Empire failed, jus gentium survived and
evolved into the law of nations, known today as public
international law.161
The jus gentium lesson may well be used for regulating the
universal and heterogeneous cyberspace. One would need to start
by identifying the principles recognized as common to all the
Rights, and Latcrit Theory: Civil and Political Rights—An Introduction, 28 U. Miami
Inter-Am. L. Rev. 223, 227 n.17 (1997).
154
Frederick Bird, Moral Universals as Cultural Realities, in ETHICAL UNIVERSALS IN
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 97, 110 (F. Neil Brady ed., Springer-Verlag 1996).
155
See Heinrich Rommen, DIE STAATSLEHRE DES FRANZ SUAREZ S.J. 275 (1926);
DYSON & STIRK, supra note 11, at 127–30.
156
See DYSON & STIRK, supra note 11, at 130.
157
See Martin Josef Schermaier, Bona Fides of Roman Contract Law, in GOOD FAITH IN
EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 63, 77 (Reinhard Zimmermann & Simon Whittaker eds.,
2000); DYSON & STIRK, supra note 11, at 130–31; 1 COLEMAN PHILLIPSON, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CUSTOM OF ANCIENT GREECE AND ROME 119–20 (MacMillan
& Co. 1911).
158
See BRIAN TIERNEY, THE IDEA OF NATURAL RIGHTS: STUDIES ON NATURAL RIGHTS,
NATURAL LAW, AND CHURCH LAW 25–30, 51–55 (Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co.
2001).
159
See JAMES BROWN SCOTT, THE CATHOLIC CONCEPTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW:
FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, FOUNDER OF THE MODERN LAW OF NATIONS, FRANCISCO SUÁREZ,
FOUNDER OF THE MODERN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN GENERAL AND IN PARTICULAR OF THE
LAW OF NATIONS: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION AND A JUSTIFIED APPRECIATION 157–60
(1934).
160
See id.
161
On the evolution of jus gentium, see generally EHRLICH, supra note 79. On the jus
naturale genesis, see generally LACHS, supra note 79, at 39–44; Goldie, supra note 79, at
569–86; Belch, supra note 79, at 225–27.
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governed. Present day deliberations on what’s fair and just, once
upon a time the exclusive domain of religious law, are left to
ethics.162 Just as religious law was used to ascertain the contents
of jus naturale, nowadays the very same set of values is the subject
of the global human rights dispute, with the UDHR representing
the current compromise on their scope.163 An analysis of the rules
and principles recognized by numerous multinational and
multistakeholder cyber-communities could efficiently stimulate
this difficult debate, taking the universal consensus embodied in
the UDHR as its starting point. By identifying universal ethical
standards and particularities unique to the cyber realm and
common to all (cyber-) communities, a global consensus could be
reached. This basic ethical standard could be considered a
reflection of what Post and Johnson once called “civic virtue.”
With the development of a hybrid economy, the civic virtue
concept would no longer seem utopian. Rather, the common goal,
strived for by all the governed, would be that of the profits of peer
production, whether monetary or not expressible through price. A
practical example would be the current rivalry between Facebook
and Google+, focused on attempting to attract forever more users
with user-friendly privacy policies, regardless of the fact that the
existing international privacy laws decrease economic efficiency.
A customary regulation for cyberspace could follow the trail
set by the Roman jus gentium. Once a set of general principles
was identified as having community acceptance and being obeyed
as a common custom, it could be raised to the status of customary
law, having legally binding power.164 The crucial challenge to
overcome would be rising to the multistakeholder model of
Internet governance. International customary law would prove to
be insufficient, as it binds only one of the three crucial groups of
stakeholders shaping the way the Internet is governed: customary
law would bind only governments as international law subjects,
162
See Jochen von Bernstorff & Ingo Venzke, Ethos, Ethics, and Morality in
International Relations, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
¶ 1, ¶ 4 (Heidelberg and Oxford Univ. Press 2013).
163
See generally OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Pages/WelcomePage.aspx (last visited Apr. 7, 2013).
164
See N. Sea Cont’l Shelf (Ger./Den.; Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20).
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disregarding business and the information society of users.
Therefore the concept of jus Internet differs substantively from
international customary law in one crucial aspect. According to
the Statute of the International Court of Justice, international
custom is defined as “evidence of a general practice accepted as
law.”165 Therefore international customary law requires two
elements to coexist. First there must be an international custom
(Latin: “usus”), which describes the existence of a uniform practice
of state authorities. For an international custom to become
customary law, that practice must be accompanied by a conviction
on the behalf of state authorities that the particular behavior—one
depicted in the customary practice—is recognized by other states
as possessing the force of law, an element described by the Latin
term of “opinio iuris.”166 The current definition of international
customary law leaves no room for considering the practice of
individuals or non-state entities (such as Internet service providers)
as constitutive of an international customary norm. What is
required to assess the evolution of a customary practice is the
activity on behalf of state authorities, including its executive,
legislative or judicial organs. What is more, the “opinio iuris”
element is assessed based on decisions of international courts,
supported by the opinions of renowned legal scholars.167 Also, this
prerequisite is impossible to meet for common practice of cybercommunities.
For example, although few national court decisions may be
identified when it comes to Creative Commons (“CC”) licenses,168
raising those national judicial examples to the rank of a possible
international compromise on the copyright challenge in cyberspace
165

Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055, 1060 [hereinafter I.C.J. Statute], available at http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/
index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0.
166
See Malcolm N. Shaw, INTERNATIONAL LAW 58 (1997).
167
I.C.J. Statute art. 38(1)(d), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060.
168
See, e.g., Lichôdmapwa v. L’asbl Festival de Theatre de Spa (Le Tribunal de
Premiere Instance de Nivelles 2010) (Belg.), available at http://wiki.creativecommons.
org/images/f/f6/2010-10-26_A%27cision-trib.-Nivelles-Lichodmapwa.pdf; Curry v.
Audax (D. Ct. Amsterdam 2006), available at http://wiki.creativecommons.org/images/
3/38/Curry-Audax-English.pdf; SGAE v. Fernández (Lower Ct. No. 6 Badajoz 2006)
(Spain),
available
at
http://wiki.creativecommons.org/images/0/03/Sentencia_
metropoli.pdf.
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would be too far-reaching. For one, international courts dealing
with public international law are not in the position to assess the
compromise on copyright protection proposed within the private
law CC licenses. Therefore, the contemporary meaning of
international customary law will not suffice to meet the needs of
the global network of peers, as it does not include a mechanism to
introduce the international peer-consensus into national legal
systems. At the same time, national legal systems may only be
shaped through international law consensus. The existing global
consensus on forever more controversial ethical issues, reached
within the fora of cyber-communities, must not be disregarded by
the international community and ought to be introduced into the
traditional international law system through soft-law instruments,
such as recommendations or declarations, reflecting current
developments.169 For instance, child pornography was declared
undesirable by the majority of cyber-communities, and privacy
policies were introduced by world’s largest ISPs in the absence of
international consensus on the protection of personal data.
Following this example, the international community should focus
on identifying the consensus already achieved by cybercommunities and encourage states to introduce harmonized
national legislations envisaging that consensus, rather than
supporting states in their efforts to enforce forever more stringent
regulations, efforts contrary to the transboundary nature of
cyberspace, such as the stupendous fiasco of the AntiCounterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) treaty in Europe,
opposed by netizens who took their online consensus onto the
street of European capitals, cities and towns.170
While the contemporary mechanism of customary law has little
to offer the cyberspace dilemma, the Roman analogy does. It
offers a solution derived from individual practice and prospectively
169

See generally The Core International Human Rights Instruments and Their
Monitoring Bodies, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx (last visited
May 13, 2013).
170
See Kevin Rawlinson, Controversial Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
Proposals Rejected by European Parliament, INDEPENDENT (July 4, 2012),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/controversial-anticounterfeiting-tradeagreement-proposals-rejected-by-european-parliament-7912065.html.
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raises it to the rank of law, just as the Roman “ius” (as opposed to
statutory “lex”)171 offered the possible codification of a custom
exercised in private (peer-to-peer) relations. Mid-twentieth century
scholarship identified the trend described above as “applied
jurisprudence.” Instead of introducing elaborate legal theories into
regulatory acts and futilely attempting to execute them, Professor
Sidney Post Simpson and Ruth Field proposed basing legal
regulation on a thorough case-law study.172 Recognizing the
shortcoming of the argument that law enforcement is the sole
explanation for why rules are obeyed and learning which methods
worked best, they argued, would allow communities to propose
more effective laws.173
The global challenges posed by transboundary and
transnational cyberspace, reflecting all the dogmatic differences in
national jurisprudence, make any dogmatic consensus
unachievable. It is only through a thorough analysis of the status
quo and a practical approach to problem solving that the current
gridlock in Internet regulation may be solved. One of the most
important considerations is the recognition of individuals and
corporations as particular groups subject to international law with
legal personality and limited yet existent authority to invoke the
responsibility of other subjects of international law in the realm of
human rights.174 Any model proposed for the management of the
Internet must acknowledge, for example, that civil society and
businesses have made valuable contributions to the debate and
require a share in the decision-making process. This is the true
essence of an efficient model for the management of the Internet.
Cyberspace has shown that the traditional pattern of
international lawmaking no longer suffices. Traditional diplomatic
tools for settling international law challenges are too slow to meet
171

See, e.g., Franz Wieacker, Ius Civile und Lex Publica in der Römischen Frühzeit, in
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR HEINZ HÜBNER 357–76 (Heinz Hübner & Gottfried Baumgärtel eds.,
Walter de Gruyter & Co. 1984).
172
See Sidney Post Simpson & Ruth Field, Social Engineering Through Law: The Need
for a School of Applied Jurisprudence, 22 N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 145, 170–71 (1947).
173
See id. at 162.
174
See Alain Pellet, The Definition of Responsibility in International Law, in THE LAW
OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 3, 5–7 (James Crawford, Alain Pellet, & Simon
Olleson eds., 2010).
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the demands of the age of cyberspace. At the same time, an
international diplomatic consensus is not sufficient in the
multistakeholder era of Internet governance. A new approach is
needed. According to the jus Internet concept, the role of the
national lawmaker would be limited to amending national
regulations according to the consensus identified in international
fora—to recognize, that is, the elements of international common
practice as fitting with national laws.
The question of a forum appropriate for such consensusseeking on standards common to all cyberspace remains open,
although numerous options may be used: from the IGF, through
Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, ITU, to the U.N.
International Law Commission deliberating a set of Draft Articles
on International Internet Law. The growing global trend of
increasing involvement and influence of non-state actors on global
politics is nowhere more blatant than in cyberspace.175 Therefore
the international community has no choice but to find a solution
enabling non-state actors to join the negotiating table. While the
role of nation-states would be to introduce appropriate national
laws, non-state actors would take it upon themselves to introduce
the resulting consensus through their terms of service or rules of
conduct, enforced through declining to render their services to or
blocking the IP addresses of notorious violators. The question of
an appropriate consensus-seeking mechanism also remains open.
One could opt for the traditional diplomatic tools, but for the
reasons named above, one could also seek new democratic
decision-making models. As already mentioned, without a doubt
all known soft-law instruments should come into play. Deriving
from the successful model of the large online community that is
Wikipedia, Zittrain proposes a model of democracy altered to meet
the particulars of cyber-communities—a “semiotic democracy.”176
It does not operate based on a simple majority of votes, but as a
more elaborate scheme it values decisions based on the strongest,

175

CHRISTOPHER T. MARSDEN, INTERNET CO-REGULATION: EUROPEAN LAW,
REGULATORY GOVERNANCE AND LEGITIMACY IN CYBERSPACE 221–41 (2011).
176
JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT 147
(2008).

C04_KULESZA_BALLESTE (DO NOT DELETE)

1344

5/16/2013 1:26 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 23:1311

most convincing arguments.177
Arguments recognized and
supported by the majority of the community should be
acknowledged as the new community standards.178
Jus Internet offers an alternative to international custom, as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law. International law
in its present shape is non-binding to non-state actors. Introducing
a system flexible enough to include willing participants from
outside governmental circles would be to envision and to
encourage the multistakeholder nature of the IG community. It
would open up the possibility of introducing regulations directly
within company terms of service or community internal rules.
Rules constitutive of jus Internet would reflect the existing
consensus among communities, both off and online.
Why should jus Internet work? For the same reason public
international law does. It originates from a strong customary
background (e.g., the evolution of the law of the sea or the law of
treaties).179 What is now a self-contained regime was once a
diversified set of principles applied by sailors or diplomats
respectively in their everyday endeavors. There are few theories as
to why international law works. The prevailing one is quite
simple: states observe international law because it pays off. Pacta
sunt servanda, a principle fundamental to international law,
encourages states to respect their obligations toward one another
because that they can reasonably expect the same in return,
granting the foreseeability of the other states’ actions.180 The same
mechanism may be used for the global cyberspace. Transboundary communities and international companies have proven
the common interest concept true online.181 Wikipedia or Linux
developers play by the community rules not in fear of sanctions but
because of a chance to participate in something bigger. Their
power is that of the group, while for that group to have this power,
it needs to operate smoothly. That is achievable solely through
177

Id.
Id.
179
See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227,
500 U.N.T.S. 95 (1961).
180
See, e.g., Hans Wehberg, Pacta Sunt Servanda, 53 Am. J. Int’l L. 775 (1959).
181
Cf. ZITTRAIN, supra note 176, at 141.
178
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setting solid foundations for collaboration: that means setting clear
rules, principles and procedures. Just as is the case with
international law, the process of setting such rules and procedures
is never finished, but the more complete it is, the stronger the
community.
Jus Internet includes two crucial elements of the global hybrid
economy. It begins as a soft law proposal, operating on universal
ethical standards common to netizens worldwide. Through judicial
recognition as a part of codes of professional conduct or good will,
it evolves into a legal model fit to meet the economic challenges
inherent in peer-production. It offers the flexibility of ethical rules
developed in a democratic process, built upon the “civic virtue”
proposed by Post and Johnson. Yet it also reflects the needs of the
commercial economy, providing a perspective of statutory law
regulation—it could serve as the stepping-stone for a treaty-based
regulation of cyberspace. The customary rules identified within
jus Internet might serve as an element for building an Internet
Framework Convention, putting cyberspace next to the open sea,
outer space or natural environment—all initially regulated by
international custom, and presently through self-contained treatybased regimes. Thus, the community-based standard of jus
gentium seems better fit to regulate the multi-national cybersociety than the nation-based Westphalian order. Even though the
history of state sovereignty highlights the importance of nationstates as major global players, the Internet Governance rule182 and
international Internet law principle183 of multistakeholderism
renders it ill-suited for cyberspace regulation.
A global consensus on human rights is the contemporary core
of jus naturale. UDHR is the stepping-stone for seeking this
consensus. What is needed now are a thorough analysis of the
human rights catalogue in its present state in light of cyberactivities currently practiced online, as well as a proposal of its
possible application to netizens. Such efforts can be successfully

182

See WSIS, supra note 106.
See R. Uerpman-Wittzack, Principles of International Internet Law, 11 German L.J.
1245, 1245–47 (2010).
183
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made by both the United Nations and NGOs.184 The role of
national authorities and governments would be to use their power
to support the new (altered) protection standards. The analysis of
the human rights catalogue online should be conducted by
professionals with experience in the field—both legal and
technical. The work provided by the United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) or the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea might serve as a good example
of such a wide, multifaceted cooperation. At the same time, it is
the role of the human rights organizations to actively participate in
the debate and raise the awareness of governments and individuals
on this crucial issue as soon as possible, and to use their experience
to support the negotiating parties in the collaboration of drafting - a
Human Rights On-Line Framework Convention.
CONCLUSION
The Westphalian order is ill-fitted for the cyberspace
environment, given that this vast frontier is composed of peers,
physically
located
within
all
geographical
locations
simultaneously, rather than a group of individuals (citizens),
physically located within nation states. Therefore a sensible way
of delimiting cyberspace—thus regulating and securing it—would
be through its communities.185 Current developments demonstrate
that law, as a tool used by states to regulate individual behaviors,
proves forever less competent to regulate online activities. Cyber
communities successfully shape their internal relations with nonlegal tools, such as codes of ethics, terms of use, and selfregulation.186
184

See Human Rights Council Res. 20/8, supra note 63 (outlining the body’s approach
to promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet); Internet Rights
and Principles Charter, INTERNET RIGHTS & PRINCIPLES COALITION,
http://internetrightsandprinciples.org/wpcharter/ (last visited May 13, 2013)
(demonstrating the successful efforts of the Internet Rights and Principles Dynamic
Coalition with its Charter of Human Rights and Principles for the Internet and related 10
Rights and Principles for Internet Governance).
185
See generally THE CYBERCULTURES READER (David Bell & Barbara M. Kennedy
eds., 2000).
186
See, e.g., Paul Hoffman, The Tao of IETF: A Novice’s Guide to the Internet
Engineering Task Force, IETF, http://www.ietf.org/tao.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2013)
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The Internet as a community should be governed in light of a
human dignity that appreciates the sum of all humanity and allows
all to enjoy the wealth available to everyone.187 Such a scenario
ought not to be deemed a utopian one. The global cooperation
achieved through pacific means is the leitmotif of Henry
Kissinger’s recent book.188 In On China, he begins with a
stunningly simple yet true recognition that neither of the
contemporary (neither the U.S. nor China) superpowers are nation
states.189 They are conglomerates of multiple communities,
nations, cultures, and values.190 Yet it is through cooperation
where possible and the continuous search of compromise that they
manage to achieve world leadership.191 Kissinger, an experienced
and supreme diplomat, saw the future of international development
not in the military confrontation of superpowers (as history
witnessed on numerous occasions), but in a “Pacific
Community”—an economic and political cooperation between the
United States and China.192 The pursuit of a compromise,
intensified through commercial and economic competition,
exchange of ideas and favors, will prove beneficial to both and will
lead to a harmonization of joint values.193 It is not through
economic or political sanctions, nor through humanitarian
interventions, that human rights recognition will be enforced
worldwide. It is rather through dialogue and compromise.
According to Kissinger, direct pressure on human rights issues

(showing important elements that could be incorporated into a future overall model of
Internet governance). Although not suggested as an overall model for Internet
governance, Avri Doria tapped into her expertise and knowledge to remind us of these
guidelines. (Avri Doria was a member of the Working Group on Internet Governance, a
civil society participant in the WSIS and was a Non-Commercial appointee to
the GNSO council within ICANN. She served as chair of the GNSO council from 2007–
2009.) See Avri Doria, The IETF as a model for the IGF, INTERNET GOVERNANCE
FORUM, http://www.intgovforum.org/contributions/IETF-as-model.pdf (last visited Apr.
16, 2013).
187
See Reisman, Wiessner & Willard, supra note 2, at 576.
188
See HENRY KISSINGER, ON CHINA 527 (2011).
189
Id.
190
Id.
191
Id.
192
Id.
193
Id.
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ought to be replaced with economic cooperation and subtle
molding of Chinese policy.194
The hope of achieving a global common ground for human
rights was also expressed by Rosalyn Higgins, the former President
of the International Court of Justice.195 Establishing the core of
such a compromise may be done solely through an analysis of
values common to the whole global community represented in
modern-day cyberspace.196 “Arguments about human uniqueness
based on what computers can’t do leave us vulnerable to technical
progress and what clever engineers might come up with.”197 The
true source of success lies on a borderless Internet where “the sum
of all its parts” brings about valuable outcomes. The efforts of the
Global Network Initiative show that the community no longer
looks to states as the only capable and authorized entities to
regulate the cyberspace and protect citizens.198
What is more, recent events in North Africa proved that
cyberspace is an efficient tool to oppose state authorities, should
individuals represented within cyber communities, find state
actions too oppressive.199 Therefore, aware of it or not, cyber
communities (with or without the encouragement of governments)
are defining the current shape of the human rights catalogue on
their own. The existing international law regime obliges every
nation state to promote and respect the observance of human rights
194

Id.
Rosalyn Higgins, Former President, International Court of Justice, speech presented
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and fundamental freedoms in accordance with the United Nations
Charter. The aforementioned Human Rights Council resolution on
freedom of expression (2009) (A/HRC/12/16) obliges states to
respect the freedom of expression also when exercised through
ICTs.200 Recognizing the “importance of all forms of the media,
including . . . the Internet,” the resolution recognizes the rights
enshrined in the ICCPR, including “the right to freedom of
expression, including the freedom to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas of all kinds . . . through any other media of
their choice.”201
The current challenge of the international community is to
identify the contents of human rights catalogue, and in particular
the right to free speech, online. That challenge may be well-faced
when the mechanism described as jus Internet is deployed. There
is no doubt that it is the duty of all law-abiding nation states of our
planet to avoid spreading fears in the name of righteousness. The
application of a territorial legal instrument to assess the limits of
human rights online (as pertaining to the Westphalian order) is
bound to defeat the idea crucial not only to the composition of the
global human rights catalogue, but also to the global network. In
the end, the defense of human rights is not for the timid.
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